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Abstract 
 
The ranking of an academic journal is important to authors, universities, journal publishers 
and research funders. Rankings are gaining prominence as countries adopt regular research 
assessment exercises that especially reward publication in high impact journals. Yet even 
within a rankings-oriented discipline like economics there is no agreement on how 
aggressively lower ranked journals are down-weighted and in how wide is the universe of 
journals considered. Moreover, since it is typically less costly for authors to cite superfluous 
references, whether of their own volition or prompted by editors, than it is to ignore relevant 
ones, rankings based on citations may be easily manipulated. In contrast, when the merits of 
publication in one journal or another are debated during hiring, promotion and salary 
decisions, the evaluators are choosing over actions with costly consequences. We therefore 
look to the academic labor market, using data on economists in the University of California 
system to relate their lifetime publications in 700 different academic journals to salary. We 
test amongst various sets of journal rankings, and publication discount rates, to see which are 
most congruent with the returns implied by the academic labor market.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The scholarly influence of research outputs affects decisions made by authors, universities, 
funding agencies and potential students. Impetus for measuring scholarly influence comes 
from formal research assessment exercises initiated in many countries to guide tertiary 
education funding and inform public perceptions of university quality.1 As publication in 
academic journals represents the principal research output for most academics, journal 
rankings have become increasingly important. While the growing coverage and ease of use of 
bibliometric databases is facilitating direct evaluation of individual research outputs, the use 
of journal rankings as a proxy for the value of published research remains the basis for many 
assessments of the research outputs of departments and individuals (e.g., Combes and 
Linnemer, 2003; Kalaitzidakis et al, 2003; Coupé, 2003; and Macri and Sinha, 2006).2  
 
Impact factors based on citations have become the most widely used indicator of 
journal quality.3 The most common is the Two Year Impact Factor; the total citations by all 
journals in a database in a particular year to papers published in the journal considered over 
the previous two years, divided by the two-year total of papers in that journal.4 Following the 
path-breaking work by Liebowitz and Palmer (1984), journal rankings in economics 
generally weight citations by an assessment of the quality of the source journal to provide 
adjusted impact factors.5 Widely used examples of this approach include Laband and Piette 
(1994), Kalaitzidias et al (1999, 2003 and 2011), Koydrzki and Yu (2006) and recursive 
impact factors from RePEc.6 Combes and Linnemer (2010) provide assessment measures for 
all journals in EconLit based on a hybrid of direct and adjusted citation based rankings, 
regression analysis and imposed assumptions about the desired convexity or quality 
aggressiveness of the journal quality weights.  
 
The growing reliance on impact factors may encourage strategic behavior. For 
example, editors may coerce authors to add citations to their journals. Wilhite and Fong 
(2012) find 175 coercing journals in their survey of researchers in economics, sociology, 
                                                 
1  For an international review of performance-based research funding in tertiary education see OECD 
(2010).  
 
2  Government research assessment exercises tend to rely more on peer review assessments. Critiques 
of the use of journal rankings in evaluating the research they publish are Oswald (2007) and Chang, 
McAleer and Oxley (2011). 
 
3  Journal rankings based on expert opinion have also been important. Examples in economics 
include assessments provided by Mason, Steagall and Fabritius (1997) and the Economic Society 
of Australia (Abelson, 2009). We use the term ‘impact factor’ broadly, to cover a variety of 
methods of assessing and ranking academic journals. 
 
4  See the Thompson Reuters (ISI) Journal Citation Reports,  
 http://wokinfo.com/products_tools/analytical/jcr/ . 
 
5  Direct citation measures such as the Two Year Impact Factor are also ‘adjusted’ by the scope of 
the database used or the definition of the subject area, i.e. citations by journals not in the database 
or not in the subject are not counted.  
 
6  Available at http://ideas.repec.org/top/. 
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psychology and business. 7  Collusion is also possible, as exemplified by the journal 
Technological and Economic Development of Economy (TEDE). Economists may be 
surprised to find this journal ranked third in the economics category in the Thompson Reuters 
(ISI) Journal Citation Reports for 2010, with a Two Year Impact Factor of 5.6; behind the 
Journal of Economic Literature and the Quarterly Journal of Economics. Thus, articles 
published in TEDE during the two previous years were cited an average of 5.6 times; this 
impact appears outstanding compared to, say, the Journal of Political Economy (4.1 citations 
per article) or the American Economic Review (3.2 citations). Closer inspection shows why. 
TEDE is published by Taylor and Francis on behalf of Vilnius Gediminas Technical 
University (VGTU) in Lithuania and 60 percent of the citations in 2010 to articles published 
in TEDE came from five journals published for the same university (including 24 percent that 
self-cite the journal).8 A further 23 percent of citations to TEDE are from two journals 
published by the nearby Vilnius University and one published by Kaunas University of 
Technology, also in Lithuania. In other words, these journals seem to have formed a cross-
citation club to help raise each other’s impact factors (another VGTU journal has an impact 
factor that was seventh in economics, just ahead of the Journal of Financial Economics).  
 
While it is possible to exclude journal self-citations and to weight citations according 
to the impact of the citing journal, even these rules can be easily circumvented.9 For example, 
since VGTU managed to lift two of their journals into the top ten in economics, cross-
citations between these two would not be ruled out and would be from journals that are 
themselves highly ranked. Moreover, individual authors could form cross-citation clubs to 
raise their personal citation counts and h-index (the author has written h papers that are each 
cited at least h times), which also inflate the impact factors of the journals they publish in. 
These individual clubs would be harder to detect than the Lithuanian-based cross-citation 
club described above. 
 
Common alternatives to impact factors, such as defining the ‘best’ journals as those 
where people in the best departments publish, run the risk of circularity, since the best 
departments are often defined as those publishing in the best journals. Moreover, reputational 
rankings are inherently backward looking and ossify a group of journals that once were best 
while failing to acknowledge the rise of dynamic new journals. Given the disruption to the 
world economy from the rise of China, India, Korea and other countries, it would be 
surprising if there were not a similar disruption to the global hierarchy of economics journals 
from this reordering of the leading nations. Hence, what is required is a robust measure of 
                                                 
7  See also the supporting analysis available from 
 www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/335/6068/542/DC1.  
 
8  The VGTU journals and their citations to TEDE are: Technological and Economic Development of 
Economy (that is, journal self-citations) (138), Journal of Business Economics and Management 
(70), International Journal of Strategic Property Management (50), Transport (45), and Journal of 
Civil Engineering and Management (44). 
 
9  For a discussion of measures of ‘citation inflation’ from journal self-citation see Chang, McAleer 
and Oxley (2011). For the 40 economics journals they consider self-citation rates vary between 0 
and 99% of non-self citations. 
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journal impacts which is not easily manipulated and which can be applied in a non-parochial 
manner. 
In this paper we use academic labor market data to sift between different rankings of 
economics journals. The basis of our approach is that for research intensive universities, 
hiring, promotion and salary advancement is likely to be directly related to perceived research 
impacts. While citations can be manipulated, when faculty debate merits of publication in one 
journal or another during salary deliberations, they are choosing over actions with costly 
consequences and so the signals provided by these decisions should be less prone to strategic 
manipulation. In our specific example, we relate salaries of economists in the University of 
California system to their lifetime publications in 700 different academic journals. These data 
enable us to test amongst various sets of competing journal rankings, looking in particular at 
the revealed convexity or aggressiveness of the weightings as they are applied to perceived 
quality of the journal. We also examine whether the academic labor market discounts older 
articles. 
 
 While there is a substantial empirical literature on the academic labor market, 
especially for economists, this research has not focused on uncovering measures of journal 
quality.10  Instead, academic earnings equations have been used to consider the negative 
impact of seniority (Ransom, 1993; Moore et al, 1998; Bratsberg et al, 2003 and 2010), the 
returns to co-authorship (Sauer, 1988; Moore et al, 2001; Hilmer and Hilmer, 2005; Hilmer et 
al, 2011), and the returns to the quantity versus the quality of research, with citations 
typically a proxy for quality and article counts a proxy for quantity (Hamermesh et al, 1982; 
Hilmer et al, 2011).11 The question of quantity versus quality is revisited by Hamermesh and 
Pfann (2012), who find that both matter to salary whereas citations (quality) are an important 
determinant of reputation (using Nobel prizes, Clark medals, Econometric Society 
fellowships and departmental reputation as proxies) but the quantum of publications is not. 
 
The closest study in the literature to the present paper is Ellison (2010), who examines 
a particular academic labor market outcome – which young economists (a PhD since 1988) 
had gained tenure at the top 25 U.S. economics departments by 2006/07. Since there is a 
hierarchy of departments, where each economist gains tenure is a proxy for the labor 
market’s assessment of his or her quality. Tenure decisions are actions with costly 
consequences, so should be highly informative and Ellison uses this information to 
discriminate between variants of the Hirsch (2005) index that is widely used in bibliometric 
research, noting:12  
 
                                                 
10  Coupé (2003) provides a somewhat dated review of research on the market for academic 
economists. 
 
11  Academic earnings equations have also been used to compare returns to research productivity 
between countries (Moore et al, 2007) and to compare rankings of departments (Gibson, 2000). 
 
12  The original Hirsch index is defined as the largest number h such that the author has written h 
papers that are each cited at least h times. Ellison (2010) introduces a generalised form of the 
Hirsch index and finds that labor market outcomes support the case for a version that places more 
emphasis on a smaller number of more highly cited papers. 
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‘…I propose that a useful criterion for assessing competing indexes (and for assessing 
whether the indexes have any value at all) is to examine whether they are consistent 
with labor market outcomes.’ (Ellison, 2010, p.1) 
 
 While Ellison (2010) does not examine journal rankings, the same logic of seeking 
congruence with labor market data can be applied to sifting between the various journal 
ranking schemes, using information from salary decisions that have costly consequences. Our 
focus on journal rankings rather than citations is because the time lag from publication to 
receiving citations is impractical for research assessment exercises that often examine just the 
last six years (Tressler and Anderson, 2012). For this reason, journal quality measures remain 
widely used as a proxy for the value of published research, not just in tea room conversations 
but also when universities make forward-looking decisions on hiring, tenure, promotion and 
salary increases. 
 
 
II. Journal Assessment Measures 
 
This section outlines key characteristics of some representative journal assessment measures 
that have been used in the economics literature. An illustration of their implications is 
provided by applying them to economists in the University of California system. Laband and 
Piette (1994) (‘LP94’ below) apply the pioneering methodology of Liebowitz and Palmer 
(1984), where adjusted impact factors are determined by using the sum of citations to each 
journal in an iterative process. The adjusted impact factors are used to weight the citation 
sources and to provide journal weights. This approach is sometimes referred to as an 
Eigenfactor approach. The ISI Journal Citation Reports provide the database of articles 
published in 1990 and their citations to papers published from 1985-1989. Only 130 
economics journals are given weights in the Laband and Piette scheme, which is the least 
permissive of any scheme considered here. 
 
Kodrzycki and Yu (2006) also apply the Liebowitz and Palmer methodology, but 
adjust for the citing intensity of sub-disciplines. While also using the ISI Journal Citation 
Reports, they develop a list of journals commonly used by economists, rather than relying 
primarily on the ISI list of economics journals. Unlike Liebowitz and Palmer and Laband and 
Piette, they consider citations from all social science journals, to provide one set of journal 
assessment measures (‘K&Y_all’ below), and citations from those journals they classified as 
economics journals for a second set of measures (‘K&Y_econ’ below).13 Citations are from 
2003 to articles published over the eight years from 1996 to 2003. The rankings are provided 
for 181 economics journals. A more recent application of the Liebowitz and Palmer 
methodology by Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2011) (‘KMS’ below) uses the 
average of the citations in each of the years 2003 to 2008 to articles published in the 
                                                 
13  Kodczychi and Yu also provide assessment measures based on citations from a set of journals they refer to 
as ‘policy’ oriented, which we do not use in this paper. 
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preceding ten years.14 The ISI Journal Citation Reports database is used and only journals 
classified as economics journals are considered, which gives non-zero rankings to 209 
journals. 
 
 While iterative (or Eigenfactor) approaches are widely used, some popular journal 
rankings are based on the simpler direct count of citations. For example, Coupé (2003) uses 
an average of two year impact factors from 1994 to 2000 based on the ISI Journal Citation 
Reports for 273 economics and related journals. 15  The Research Papers in Economics 
(RePEc) website provides a number of different journal impact assessments using the RePEc 
citation database. The assessment measure used in this paper is the basic impact factor based 
on direct citations, which is corrected for self-cites to journals, but not self-cites to an 
author’s own papers. This is one of the most permissive schemes, in that impact factors are 
provided for 984 journals.16 
 
 The other permissive ranking, in the sense of trying to not exclude any economics 
journal, is from Combes and Linnemer (2010). These authors use a number of approaches in 
order to cover all EconLit journals. They start with 304 journals drawn from EconLit and the 
ISI Journal Citation Reports, then combine several citation indices, adjusted for the field of 
specialization, and use a Google Scholar h-index to regress their index on Google Scholar 
citation data to extrapolate it to all EconLit journals. Assessment measures are proposed 
based on assumptions about the degree of convexity or quality aggressiveness desired. We 
use the Combes and Linnemer ‘medium’ convexity measure and the ‘high’ convexity 
measure (‘CLm’ and ‘CLh’ below). These assessment measures are available for 1168 
journals. 
 
 The difference between the ‘medium’ and the ‘high’ convexity measures is illustrated 
in Figure 1, for the top 102 journals in the Combes-Linnemer scheme. These comprise their 
‘AAA’, ‘AA’ and ‘A’ groups, with the bottom ranked journal in the ‘A’ group being Applied 
Economics. The ‘medium’ and ‘high’ convexity indexes are similar for the top four journals 
but then a large gap opens up, with the fifth ranked journal (Review of Economic Studies) 
being equivalent to either 0.81 of the top journal (QJE) under medium convexity or else just 
0.66 under high convexity. The relative penalty for lower ranked journals then grows, with 
the 20th journal being either 0.54 or 0.29 of the QJE and the 50th ranked being just 0.30 or 
0.09 of the QJE. To provide a sense of the type of journal at various ranks, Figure 1 
highlights the position of four general interest journals of varying quality and their CLm and 
CLh indexes: the Economic Journal (64.5, 41.6), Economics Letters (30.4, 9.2), Economic 
Inquiry (24.2, 5.9) and the Southern Economic Journal (19.0, 3.6). These are large gaps in the 
                                                 
14  This is an update of the widely used Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2003) measures. In our 
analysis the journal impact factors used are taken from their 2010 Working Paper. 
 
15  The list we use was obtained from http//homepages.ulb.ac.be/~tCoupe/update/journals.html (on 20 
August 2007). 
 
16  The list we use was obtained on May 6, 2012 and as of July 2012 RePEc had grown to cover 1004 
journals. 
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assessment of relative impact and so it should be possible to detect which degree of convexity 
is most congruent with labor market data. 
 
 
Figure 1: Convexity of Journal Rankings in Combes-Linnemer Scheme (classes A-AAA) 
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The final approach to ranking journals we consider gives an alternative to using 
citations. Instead, Mason, Steagall and Fabritius (1997) (‘MSF’ below) derive reputational 
weights from a survey of chairs of economics department in the United States. All 965 
departments listed in the December 1989 AER were surveyed in 1992 and 1993 with a 
response rate of 22.4% yielding 216 usable replies.  Respondents ranked journals on a 0 to 4 
scale (allowing non-integer scores). This ranking has a relatively low degree of convexity, in 
the sense of not heavily penalizing lower ranked journals.17 But these reputational weights are 
only available for 142 journals so MSF is the second least permissive of the schemes that we 
consider. 
 
 It is clear from this discussion that journal assessment schemes differ in three main 
ways: the ranking of journals, the degree of coverage or non-zero weights, and the convexity 
of the weights applied. We illustrate these aspects by applying each of the nine schemes 
considered to the lifetime publications by the University of California economists in our 
sample (described below). Applying these schemes to the output of actual economists helps 
show the important impact of coverage assumptions. In fact, the two least permissive 
schemes (MSF and LP94) would exclude over one-third of the academic articles published by 
                                                 
17  For example, the relative weight for the Southern Economic Journal compared with the AER is from 0.02 to 
0.20, with an average of 0.12, for eight of the nine schemes that we use. But the MSF scheme gives it a 
weight of 0.73. 
CLm: medium convexity 
CLh:  high convexity 
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economists working in economics departments in the largest research-intensive public 
university system in the United States (Table 1). It is unclear that the academic labor market 
also places zero value on publication in these excluded journals. Even the most permissive 
schemes that attempt to cover the universe of economics journals (RePEc and Combes-
Linnemer) would miss over one-tenth of the articles published by these economists.18  
 
Table 1 
 
To show the convexity of each scheme we estimate: log(relative 
weight)=α+βlog(rank), where the relative weight=1.0 for the highest ranked journal and the 
regressions are estimated on the non-zero weighted journals published in by the academics in 
our sample. The rank elasticities in Table 1 range from -0.22, for the least aggressive scheme 
(MSF), to -1.92, for the most convex (LP94). It is clear that CLh is hardly the most convex of 
the schemes, with four others having a more elastic response of journal weights to rank 
(K&Y_all, K&Y_econ, KMS and LP94). These same four schemes also exclude at least one-
quarter of lifetime articles, so they can be considered to be especially aggressive in their 
focus on perceived journal quality. 
 
 The final column of Table 1 reports the average lifetime weighted journal output of 
the economists in our sample, in terms of AER-sized pages (using 1/n for co-authored 
papers). This is the key variable which will be used to explain academic salaries, and it varies 
from 144 pages under the MSF journal rankings to just 36 pages with the LP94 weights. This 
four-fold difference should be large enough to allow the salary data to discriminate between 
the various schemes, which are ranked in Table 1 from least aggressive to most aggressive, in 
terms of the combined impact of the assumptions about non-coverage and convexity.  
   
 
III. Data 
 
Our approach of using labor market data to uncover the implied quality of academic journals 
can be applied to any group of academics, in any discipline in any country. We decided to 
focus on economists within economics departments in the nine campuses of the University of 
California system for three reasons. First, the public disclosure database of California state 
worker salaries (http://www.sacbee.com/statepay/) is unusually detailed, as we describe 
below. Second, this gives us a well-defined target sample frame that is likely to be of inherent 
interest – the largest research-intensive public university system in the United States. While 
the salary returns to various journals may differ in private universities or in other public 
systems, for the first study of journal rankings using salary data it makes sense to start with 
the largest system (that is, there is good external validity in studying the University of 
California). Third, while all University of California campuses are research-intensive, they 
span the perceived quality range from excellent (e.g. Berkeley), to very good (e.g. Davis) to 
those that are less highly ranked (e.g. Riverside) and emerging (e.g. Merced). This range of 
                                                 
18  These are all academic articles, as captured in the union of the EconLit, RePEc and Web of Science databases, 
so the under-coverage of articles is not because they are not part of the peer-reviewed scientific literature. 
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quality allows us to test if some journal ranking schemes do a better job of matching labor 
market outcomes in the best departments.19  
 
In order for labor market data to provide a valid signal of perceived journal quality, 
the sample has to be relatively homogeneous in terms of the weight placed on research 
performance in salary determination. So we excluded anyone with significant non-department 
administrative responsibilities (e.g. Deans) and those with primarily teaching roles (including 
affiliated faculty, adjuncts and those obviously on part-time contracts). While economists 
infiltrate many other departments we did not consider those for our sample since the returns 
to publishing in particular economics journals may differ in, say, an agricultural economics 
department or even in an economics department in the business school. These restrictions left 
us with a sample of 223 and while this is smaller than in many other studies using academic 
earnings equations, it has the advantage of being for a well-defined population of interest 
rather than simply a hodge-podge of universities with publicly available salary data. 
 
The salary data are unusually detailed, with the base salary reported for 2007, 2009 
and 2010 and the total salary reported for those three years and also for 2008. Total salary is 
more temporally volatile than base salary, with squared deviations of annual salary around 
the multi-year mean for an individual being 32 percent higher, on average, when using total 
salary rather than base salary.20 When we calculate the ratio of total salary to base salary for 
each individual, this varies from 0.8 to 2.7, suggesting that the total salary received in any 
year may not be a good guide to the long-run ‘permanent’ salary. Moreover, while the total-
to-base ratio averages 1.10 across all three years, it fell from 1.14 in 2007 to 1.07 in 2010, 
presumably because the worsening financial position of the State of California meant that 
cuts were being made in extra-ordinary salary payments. For these reasons we use the base 
salary rather than the total salary. 
 
Another helpful feature of the salary data provided by the Sacramento Bee website is 
that details are provided on the nature of the employment contract, in terms of the pay period. 
Almost all academics in economics departments at the University of California are on 
academic year rather than financial year contracts (in contrast to, say, those in agricultural 
economics departments). In a few cases, especially at UC Berkeley, some economists are on 
law school scales, so we include a dummy variable in our regressions for individuals whose 
reported salary is not for a standard scale and 9-month academic year. In contrast, some 
previous studies of faculty salaries have had to drop individuals for whom it was unclear if 
their reported salaries were on a 9-month academic year basis (Hamermesh and Pfann, 2012). 
                                                 
19  Combes and Linnemer (2010) suggest that their high convexity index ‘is useful to compare the 
best departments’ (p.2), while their medium convexity index is better suited to study middle 
ranked departments. 
 
20  This calculation is limited to individuals with three years of data for each type of salary and with 
no decline in base salary over time (which may signal only a partial year’s employment as could 
occur from someone moving to another position). For these individuals, the squared deviation of 
annual salary from the three-year average has a mean (median) of $1443 ($312) for total salary and 
$1093 ($213) for base salary (all in millions). 
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 In addition to salaries we gathered data on gender, the year of first appointment and of 
hire at the current department, the year of obtaining a PhD (and the department and 
university) and whether the current appointment was named (such as an endowed or 
distinguished chair). These details were available from departmental web pages and on-line 
CVs for most academics and otherwise we obtained them from dissertation databases and 
from changes in affiliations on journal articles to date movements. The on-line CVs also 
provided the initial information on publications, which were supplemented with searches of 
EconLit, RePEc and the Web of Science. Measuring the research outputs of academics with 
common names can be difficult, but with so many of the sample having their CVs on-line it 
helped cross-validate the database search results. We restrict attention to articles that were 
actually published (with pagination) by the end of 2010. Since our focus is on journal articles, 
we did not include book reviews, book chapters, editorial introductions or conference 
proceedings.21 The one exception is AER Papers and Proceedings (even though many CVs 
listed this in the ‘non-refereed’ section) because seven of the journal assessment schemes 
make no distinction between the May issue of the AER and other issues, while LP94 weight 
the May issue at one-quarter of ordinary issues. Only KMS give Papers and Proceedings a 
weight of zero. In total, our procedures recorded 5,721 articles in 700 different journals that 
the 223 economists in our sample had published in over their careers. 
 
 Appendix Table 1 presents definitions and summary statistics for the variables used in 
the academic earnings equations. The dependent variable is (log) base salary in 2010, with a 
mean for the underlying salary data of $156,700 and a range from $78,000 to $310,000 (the 
maximum total salary is $458,900).22 The average economist in the sample had spent 12.2 
years at the current university and 18 years at all appointments. One-sixth of the sample is 
female. Three indicator variables for atypical salary levels (and potentially influential data 
points) are included: whether the academic is on a non-standard contract, whether they have a 
named position (which may provide funds for additional salary) and whether they are a Nobel 
Prize winner (only one individual). Finally, three indicators of PhD quality are also included: 
the rank of the PhD-granting department in either the 1995 National Research Council 
rankings or the Amir and Knauff (2008) rankings, and an indicator for those economists 
whose PhD was not from an economics department. 
 
 
IV. Results  
 
The first step in our analysis is to obtain a well-specified academic earnings equation to then 
use as the testing ground for comparing each journal ranking scheme. In Table 2 we report 
the results of various specifications which suggest the following: indicators of quality for the 
                                                 
21  We did gather the number of authored books (but not edited volumes) from EconLit but this 
proved to have no explanatory power in the earnings equations. 
 
22  In a few cases the 2010 base salary was lower than in 2009 or 2007, which may signal partial year 
employment as could occur from someone moving to another position, so for these individuals we 
used their maximum base salary from 2007 or 2009. 
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PhD-granting department are not relevant to salary for this sample (columns (1) to (3)); all 
three of the indicators that we use for atypical salary levels (and potentially influential data 
points) are statistically significant (columns (4) to (6)); the effects of seniority and experience 
on salary are best modeled as quadratics; there is weak evidence of a premium for males; and, 
location fixed effects are highly significant. Based on these observations, the equation in 
column (7) of Table 2 is used as the base specification, to which we will then add an output 
variable measuring lifetime publications in journals, as weighted under each of the nine 
assessment schemes. Even without the output variable, the base specification explains 
72 percent of the variation in log salary, which is higher than the predictive power of 
academic earnings equations in other studies. 
 
Table 2 
 
 To create the output variable, the number of pages of each of the 5,721 journal articles 
published by our sample members are multiplied by the assessment weight of the journal. We 
also adjust for the number of authors of each article (using the ‘1/n rule’) and standardize 
pages to the size of a typical page in the AER.23 Thus for each article published by each 
individual academic the measured output is: 
 
( ) WeightAssessmentJournalauthorsofnumberCorrectionSizePagesArticle ××× 1  
 
and to calculate the lifetime output measure we sum over articles published from the year of 
the first article until the end of 2010. The full results for the nine different earnings equations, 
where each in turn uses a different set of journal assessment weights to summarize lifetime 
output, are reported in Appendix Table 2. For these models, the R2 ranges from 0.76 to 0.78, 
so the incremental R2 from including the lifetime output measure is 0.04 to 0.06. However, 
since lifetime output is correlated with experience and seniority, another way to measure the 
explanatory power of this variable would be to include it first. If we run a simple regression 
of log salary on each of the lifetime output variables, the R2 values would range from 0.46 
(using MSF or Coupé weights) to 0.52 (using CLm or CLh weights). 
 
The coefficients on the output measures and a series of model comparison statistics 
are reported in Table 3. The nine different earnings equations are non-nested, in the sense that 
it is not possible to impose a set of linear restrictions to derive one model from the other. A 
standard procedure for model comparison in this case is to use information criteria, with the 
Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) 
typically used. We can also compare R2  since all the equations have the same number of 
explanatory variables. The maximized R2 and log-likelihood, and the minimized loss of 
information, is for the earnings equation that uses CLm – the medium convexity weights of 
Combes and Linnemer (2010). Even though the MSF weights are the second least permissive, 
                                                 
23  Page correction factors were supplied by Joseph Macri, based on his work with the late Dependra 
Sinha. A value of 0.72 was used for journals with no factor available. This is the average page size 
for the lowest ranked journals in Gibson (2000), and these are typically the ones without their own 
size correction factors available. 
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in excluding one-third of the lifetime articles published by this sample, they provide the 
second best congruence with the labor market data. The greatest loss of information comes 
from using the KMS weights, which are the second most convex and the third least 
permissive. 
Table 3 
 
 Our focus is on which journal ranking scheme is most congruent with the salary data, 
but it is also worth interpreting the magnitudes of some of the regression coefficients. Using 
the best-fitting model, the coefficient on the output measure suggests that a 10-page article 
would raise salary by 1.3 percent, which is an increase of $2090 at the mean. With a 40-year 
career and a five percent discount rate, for the average economist in the sample (who is 
18 years into their career) such an article would have a net present value of just over $27,500. 
Amongst the other variables previously identified from the specification search in Table 2, all 
are statistically significant at conventional levels except for Male (which has t-statistics 
between 1.0 and 1.5). The location fixed effects are smaller than in Table 2, suggesting that 
some of the apparent salary premium at UC Berkeley was productivity-related, but all remain 
statistically significant.24 The quadratics suggest that for the average economist, salary is 
maximized after 30 years of labor market experience and minimized after 27 years of 
seniority at the current university. 
 
Formal Non-nested Tests 
Non-nested tests can help formally discriminate between the competing models in Table 3. 
These test the validity of one linear model, H0 as opposed to its non-nested alternative H1: 
 
H0: 0ε+= Xβy  
H1: 1ε+= Zγy  
 
where X and Z are matrices of explanatory variables, and neither is a linear combination of 
the other, β and γ are corresponding parameter vectors, and ε0 and εl are random errors. 
Forming a ‘compound’ model with each competing measure of lifetime output included at the 
same time is not advisable because of possible multicollinearity. Moreover, this artificial 
nesting approach does not distinguish between H0 and H1; instead, it distinguishes between 
each competing model and a hybrid (Greene, 2012). This can be seen by writing the 
compound model as: 
 
ε+++= WδγZβXy  
 
where X holds the set of variables in X not in Z, Z holds the set of variables in Z not in X, 
and W has the variables common to the two models. While the test of 0=γ might seem to 
reject H1 and 0=β might reject H0, since δ remains a mixture of parts of β and γ it is not 
                                                 
24  The UCLA fixed effects become larger (and more significant) positive values once output 
measures are included. 
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established by the F-test on the compound model that either of these parts is zero (Greene, 
2012). 
 
Instead, we use Vuong’s (1989) likelihood ratio test that does not presume that either 
competing model is ‘true’, and instead determines which competitor has verisimilitude (that 
is, is closer to the truth). This approach relies on the Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion 
(KLIC), which intuitively, is the log-likelihood function under the hypothesis of the true 
model minus the log-likelihood function for the (potentially misspecified) model under the 
assumption of the true model. One model is ‘better’ than another if it is closer to the ‘truth’ 
under the KLIC (Greene, 2012, p.535). Vuong’s test is directional, with large positive values 
favoring the null model while large negative values favor the alternative (and values between 
-1.96 and +1.96 are inconclusive, for 95 percent significance). We corroborate results for a 
subset of the bilateral comparisons using Pesaran’s (1974) version of a Cox likelihood ratio 
test, where the null model is rejected against the alternative if there are large negative values 
of the test statistic. The test is then reversed to see if the alternative is rejected against the null.  
 
The pairwise comparisons of each model, using Vuong’s test to see which is closer to 
the truth, are reported in Table 4. For ease of interpretation, the models are ordered with those 
using the least aggressive weighting schemes listed first. The format of the table is that each 
cell contains a bilateral z-statistic test result, with significant positive values counting as 
evidence in favor of the model in the column against the model in the row and negative 
values counting as evidence for the row model against the column model. The model that 
uses CLm, the medium convexity weights of Combes and Linnemer, is favored against all of 
the competing models except for the one using MSF weights, for which the comparison is 
inconclusive (z=-1.40). The comparison of models that use the CLm and CLh weights to 
calculate lifetime output yields a significant rejection of the high convexity weights (z=2.27), 
which is notable since there is no difference in coverage between these rankings. The only 
other significant results in the table are that the model using KMS weights is rejected against 
the model using CLh weights, and also weakly rejected against the model using MSF weights 
(at p=0.052).25  
Table 4 
 
 The results in Table 4 suggest the less aggressive journal weighting schemes are most 
congruent with salaries of University of California economists. To see how robust this 
finding is, Cox-Pesaran tests were carried out to compare the models using CLm and CLh 
weights, and those using MSF, KMS and LP94 weights, since these capture the extremes in 
terms of least and most aggressive down-weighting for lower ranked journals. The model 
using CLh weights is rejected against the one using CLm weights (p=0.00) while there is no 
reverse rejection (p=0.30). Similarly, the model using LP94 weights is rejected against the 
model using CLm weights (p=0.00) but not the reverse (p=0.26). When the least aggressive 
MSF weights are used, the model using KMS weights (the second most aggressive) is 
                                                 
25  The model using Coupé weights is also weakly rejected against the model using MSF weights (at 
p=0.099). 
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rejected against it (p=0.00) while there is no reverse rejection (p=0.23), and the models with 
MSF weights and LP94 weights reject against each other. Thus the congruence of the less 
aggressive journal weighting schemes with the salary data appears to be a robust finding that 
does not depend on using just one type of non-nested test. 
 
Should Older Articles be Discounted? 
 
The results reported thus far treat an article published in, say, 1978 the same as one from 
2008; adjustments are made for length, co-authors, page sizes and journal impact factor, but 
not for vintage. To test if this assumption of no age discounting is appropriate, we calculated 
for each article published by each academic in year t:  
 ( ) ( ) WeightAssessmentJournalauthorsofnumberCorrectionSizeAgePagesArticle ×××× 1)(1 δ  
 
where ,2011 tAge −=  and the age discount factor, δ varied from 0 to 2, in increments of 0.1. 
In other words, we allowed for no age discounting (δ=0), for inverse age discounting (δ=1) 
where a 20-year old article has 1/20th the impact on current salary of a 1-year old article, and 
for a variety of more extreme and intermediate cases. The best-fitting model, using CLm 
weights, was estimated for each of these 21 values of δ and the maximized log-likelihoods 
are compared in Figure 2. There appears to be weak age discounting, with the log-likelihood 
maximized at δ=0.4, which is four-points above the value at δ=0. The maximized likelihood 
declines steeply at higher discount rates.26 
 
Figure 2: Searching for Optimal Discount Factor for Age Discounting of Articles 
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δ
Maximised Log‐Likelihood
 
 Notes: Based on the regression specification in Appendix Table 2, using CLm weights. 
                                                 
26  If the models with different values of δ were instead estimated after using the CLh weights to 
summarize lifetime output, the log-likelihood would maximise at δ=0.3 (although at just 0.35 
points above the log-likelihood at δ=0.4). So this evidence of weak age discounting is not specific 
to the journal weighting scheme used. 
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To check if our finding of greater congruence between salary and the less aggressive 
journal weighting schemes is robust to different assumptions about the age discounting of 
articles, the academic earnings equations were re-estimated. Since there is no rule-of-thumb 
for ( )4.0)(1 Age  we discounted according to the inverse of the square root of age, ( )5.0)(1 Age  
noting that there was only a half-point difference in the maximized log-likelihoods at δ=0.4 
and δ=0.5. The full set of estimation results is reported in Appendix Table 3 and the results of 
the Vuong non-nested tests are in Table 5.  
 
Table 5  
 
The salary data continue to favor the less aggressive journal weighting schemes when 
age-discounting of articles is allowed for. The model using the least aggressive MSF weights 
previously weakly rejected against two models but it now rejects against four (KMS, Coupé 
and both Kodrzycki and Yu schemes). Similarly the model with CLm weights now rejects 
against six models (and against the model using Coupé weights at p=0.118). Moreover, the 
models using six of the assessment schemes now reject against the model using the KMS 
weights (which are the second most aggressive), whereas previously only three models 
rejected against this scheme. The final change caused by allowing age discounting is that the 
model using the simple RePEc impact factors now rejects against three others (both 
Kodrzycki and Yu schemes and KMS) whereas previously that model rejected against no 
others. 
 
Are Results Different for the Best Departments? 
 
Combes and Linnemer (2010) suggest that their high convexity weights are useful to compare 
the best departments while their medium convexity index is suitable for middle ranked 
departments. We therefore examine whether the finding that the salary data favor less convex 
journal weights for calculating lifetime output is also found if we restrict attention just to the 
top four economics departments in the University of California system: Berkeley, San Diego, 
Davis and Los Angeles. In keeping with the results on age discounting, the lifetime output is 
calculated using the inverse of the square root of the age of each article. The full set of 
estimation results is reported in Appendix Table 4 and the results of the Vuong non-nested 
tests for the sub-sample of academics in the best four departments are in Table 6. 
 
Table 6  
 
 There is no evidence that salaries of academics in the best four departments are better 
explained by more convex journal weighting schemes. In fact, the Vuong tests suggest that 
the model using the least convex MSF weights now rejects against six of the other models 
(being inconclusive only against the models with CLm and LP94 weights). Moreover, the 
Cox-Pesaran test suggests that the model using LP94 weights is rejected against the model 
using MSF weights (p=0.00) but the reverse rejection is only weakly significant (p=0.07). 
The other change between Table 5 and Table 6 is that the model using the Coupé weights, 
which are the third least convex, now rejects against two of the models using more convex 
weights (K&Y_all and KMS) whereas previously it only rejected against the model using 
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KMS weights. Finally, in terms of the specific claim of Combes and Linnemer that their high 
convexity weights are most suitable for comparing the best departments, the salary evidence 
suggests the opposite. Under both the Vuong test (z=3.00) and the Cox-Pesaran test (p=0.00) 
the model using CLh weights is significantly rejected against the model using CLm weights. 
 
What Weight should be placed on AER Papers and Proceedings? 
 
The journal assessment schemes that we use differ in their treatment of the Papers and 
Proceedings May issue of the AER. While seven of the schemes do not discriminate, KMS 
places zero weight on articles in the May issue and LP94 gives them about one-quarter of the 
weight of ordinary issues. The Papers and Proceedings issue is a common outlet for the 
University of California economists in our sample, with 160 articles published there (and 242 
in the other issues of the AER). We therefore use our academic earnings equations to see what 
the data indicate about the appropriate weight to place on Papers and Proceedings compared 
with ordinary issues of the AER. Our best-fitting model, using CLm weights with articles 
discounted according to the inverse of the square-root of their age, was re-estimated 101 
times, incrementally decreasing the weight for articles in the Papers and Proceedings issue 
from 100 percent of an ordinary AER down to zero. The maximized log-likelihoods from this 
search procedure are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Maximized Log-Likelihoods from Search for Best Fitting Relative Weight  
for AER Papers and Proceedings 
 
 
 The salary data suggest that treating one page in the Papers and Proceedings issue as 
equivalent to 58 percent of a page in the other issues of the AER is most appropriate. Thus 
journal assessment schemes that do not discriminate between the May issue and other issues 
(likely because they rely on ISI data that do not distinguish journal issue numbers when 
counting citations) would seem to overstate the impact of Papers and Proceedings. On the 
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other hand, the two assessment schemes that do discriminate may have down-weighted 
Papers and Proceedings too heavily. Nevertheless we caution that the difference in the 
maximized log-likelihoods is very small, across any of the values of the relative weight term 
for Papers and Proceedings. These small differences suggest that even for journals in which 
our sample have published a large number of articles, deriving journal-specific impact factors 
from the salary data – what might be dubbed ‘Market Impact Factors’ – would be difficult. 
While we have statistical power to discriminate between different schemes for weighting the 
entire spectrum of journals, to derive valuations for individual journals would likely take a far 
larger sample. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have compared nine different sets of economics journal assessment measures 
to find which is most consistent with labor market outcomes. These journal assessment 
measures differ according to the ranking of journals, the degree of coverage, and the 
convexity of the weights applied. The most aggressive schemes, in terms of either ignoring or 
down-weighting lower ranked journals, exclude more than one-quarter of the lifetime output 
of our sample of University of California economists. The aggressive schemes also imply a 
very substantial penalty for publishing in lower ranked journals; for example, an article in a 
journal like Economic Inquiry that is just outside the top 50 journals is equivalent to less than 
ten percent of a similarly-sized article in the American Economic Review or the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics.   
 
 The clear picture that emerges from the empirical results is that the labor market does 
not reward publication in ways consistent with the weights implied by the most aggressive 
journal assessment measures. Instead, it is when lifetime output is weighted according to the 
least convex schemes, such as those of Mason, Steagall and Fabritius (1997) and the CLm 
index of Combes and Linnemer (2010), that the greatest congruence with academic salaries is 
found. This finding is robust to different assumptions about the age discounting of articles 
and also holds if we restrict attention just to the best departments. Indeed, this last result, that 
a model using high convexity weights is rejected against a less convex alternative if tested on 
the top four University of California economics departments is contrary to the claim of 
Combes and Linnemer (2010) that a high convexity index is more suited for comparing the 
best departments.  
 
 We view this congruence with labor market information as an important criterion for 
the reasonableness of a journal ranking scheme. While highly convex journal ranking 
schemes can be derived from citation data, such data may be manipulated by editors who 
coerce authors to add superfluous citations and by authors and editors who collude in cross-
citation clubs to raise the citation counts for particular journals or particular individuals. In 
contrast, labor market decisions have costly consequences, so the preference for convexity (or 
lack of) in journal ranking schemes that is revealed by labor market outcomes is a pattern that 
comes from information that should be less prone to strategic manipulation. 
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Table 1: Indicators of the Aggressiveness of Various Journal Impact Factors  
as Applied to Publications of UC Economists 
 
 % of lifetime 
articles with zero 
weight 
 Rank-Elasticity Regressiona Average lifetime output 
for UC economistsb Source of Impact Factor  Elasticity Std Error R-squared  
MSF: Mason, Steagall & Fabritius  33.3 -0.22 0.01 0.74 143.6 
CLm: Coomes-Linnemer (medium) 10.9 -0.67 0.01 0.97 106.3 
CLh: Coomes-Linnemer (high) 10.9 -1.35 0.01 0.97 69.7 
RePEc Simple Impact Factor 12.6 -1.17 0.04 0.76 65.2 
Coupé (2003) 22.0 -0.78 0.03 0.81 45.5 
K&Y_all: Kodrzycki & Yu (2006) 26.4 -1.48 0.05 0.85 40.0 
K&Y_econ: Kodrzycki & Yu (2006) 26.0 -1.53 0.05 0.84 37.0 
KMS: Kalaitzidakis et al (2011) 29.6 -1.74 0.07 0.80 38.2 
LP94: Laband & Piette (1994) 36.4 -1.92 0.09 0.82 35.9 
 
Note: 
Author’s calculations based on 5721 journal articles produced by 213 University of California economists and journal weights from the sources noted. 
a Estimated over the journals with non-zero weights for each scheme using log(relative weight)=α+βlog(rank). 
b Total number of AER-sized pages (with co-authors given 1/n) published in career through 2010, where journals are weighted such that the highest ranked 
journal for each scheme has weight 1.0 and there is no age-discounting for older articles.
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Table 2: Salary Regressions for UC Economists:  
Individual Characteristics, Salary Attributes and Location Fixed Effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Seniority (years) -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.022 -0.020 -0.021 
 (3.05)** (3.02)** (3.04)** (2.95)** (3.38)** (3.06)** (3.28)** 
Seniority squared (/100) 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.029 0.024 0.030 
 (1.21) (1.22) (1.24) (1.25) (1.61) (1.26) (1.60) 
Experience (years) 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.050 
 (10.94)** (10.99)** (10.97)** (10.72)** (10.21)** (10.79)** (9.89)** 
Experience squared (/100) -0.072 -0.072 -0.072 -0.073 -0.074 -0.072 -0.075 
 (6.06)** (6.14)** (6.17)** (6.06)** (6.16)** (6.08)** (6.02)** 
Male 0.060 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.066 0.065 0.071 
 (1.47) (1.41) (1.43) (1.44) (1.65)+ (1.61) (1.81)+ 
PhD field not economics -0.037       
 (0.90)       
PhD rank (A&K, 2008)  0.000      
  (0.33)      
PhD rank (NRC, 1995)   0.001     
   (0.08)     
Nobel prize winner    0.431   0.346 
    (7.37)**   (6.36)** 
Holder of a named chair     0.146  0.137 
     (3.84)**  (3.70)** 
Not standard pay scale      0.113 0.115 
      (2.17)* (2.07)* 
Davis -0.449 -0.445 -0.448 -0.449 -0.410 -0.432 -0.397 
 (8.71)** (8.38)** (8.65)** (8.67)** (8.16)** (7.97)** (7.62)** 
Irvine -0.392 -0.386 -0.391 -0.389 -0.362 -0.376 -0.347 
 (8.74)** (8.27)** (8.81)** (8.71)** (7.89)** (7.99)** (7.18)** 
Merced -0.454 -0.458 -0.465 -0.462 -0.445 -0.451 -0.428 
 (9.08)** (8.10)** (8.62)** (9.07)** (6.61)** (8.35)** (6.38)** 
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Table 2 continued        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Riverside -0.472 -0.466 -0.472 -0.470 -0.412 -0.463 -0.404 
 (8.83)** (8.17)** (8.63)** (8.61)** (7.42)** (8.39)** (7.19)** 
San Diego -0.200 -0.199 -0.200 -0.200 -0.142 -0.185 -0.131 
 (3.85)** (3.78)** (3.84)** (3.85)** (2.72)** (3.43)** (2.45)* 
Santa Barbara -0.406 -0.400 -0.405 -0.422 -0.358 -0.389 -0.359 
 (7.86)** (7.50)** (7.84)** (8.46)** (7.07)** (7.18)** (7.00)** 
Santa Cruz -0.439 -0.435 -0.440 -0.440 -0.384 -0.425 -0.373 
 (7.87)** (7.69)** (7.93)** (7.99)** (7.30)** (7.44)** (6.92)** 
Los Angeles 0.033 0.036 0.033 0.034 0.069 0.048 0.084 
 (0.60) (0.65) (0.60) (0.62) (1.27) (0.84) (1.49) 
Constant 11.696 11.689 11.692 11.695 11.662 11.678 11.647 
 (210.07)** (202.75)** (189.47)** (209.67)** (207.02)** (202.31)** (202.41)** 
R-squared 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.72 
 
Note:  
Dependent variable is log of base salary for the 2010 academic year, as reported at: http://www.sacbee.com/statepay/ with economists at UC Berkeley as the 
excluded group for the fixed effects. N=223, robust t statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%. 
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Table 3: Comparisons of Academic Earnings Equations  
Using Different Journal Assessment Weights to Compute Lifetime Output 
 
 
Academic Earnings Equation Regression Maximized 
log-
likelihood 
Akaike’s Info 
Criteria 
Bayesian 
Info Criteria 
Semi-
elasticitya Robust Std Error R-squared 
MSF: Mason, Steagall & Fabritius  0.009 0.001 0.77 83.66 -133.33 -75.40 
CLm: Coomes-Linnemer (medium) 0.013 0.002 0.78 87.49 -140.99 -83.07 
CLh: Coomes-Linnemer (high) 0.017 0.003 0.77 83.06 -132.12 -74.20 
RePEc Simple Impact Factor 0.016 0.002 0.77 80.00 -126.00 -68.07 
Coupé (2003) 0.023 0.004 0.76 79.28 -124.57 -66.65 
K&Y_all: Kodrzycki & Yu (2006) 0.023 0.004 0.76 79.07 -124.13 -66.21 
K&Y_econ: Kodrzycki & Yu (2006) 0.025 0.004 0.76 78.92 -123.84 -65.92 
KMS: Kalaitzidakis et al (2011) 0.024 0.005 0.76 75.63 -117.27 -59.34 
LP: Laband & Piette (1994) 0.027 0.004 0.77 80.27 -126.53 -68.61 
 
Notes:  
The results are from nine separate regressions, where each includes all of the variables in column (7) of Table 2 plus the total number of AER-sized pages (with 
co-authors given 1/n) published in each economist’s career through 2010, where journals are weighted such that the highest ranked journal for each scheme has 
weight 1.0 and there is no age-discounting for older articles. Full results of the regressions are reported in Appendix Table 2. N=223. 
 
a The semi-elasticity shows the percentage increase in annual (academic year) salary for a 10-page increase in total career output of weighted journal articles. 
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Table 4: Vuong Test Results Comparing Academic Earnings Functions  
With Different Journal Assessment Weights Used to Calculate Lifetime Output
MSF  (a) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
CLm (b) -1.40        
CLh (c)  0.17 2.27       
RePEc (d) 1.28 3.00 1.19      
Coupé (e) 1.65 2.41 0.95 0.29     
K&Y_all (f) 1.31 2.80 1.41 0.56 0.08    
K&Y_econ (g) 1.34 2.81 1.46 0.68 0.13 0.49   
KMS (h) 1.94 3.49 3.11 1.45 0.89 1.13 1.11  
LP94 (g) 0.80 2.24 1.11 -0.08 -0.23 -0.37 -0.42 -1.37
Note: Cell values are z-statistics, calculated from the models reported in Appendix Table 2.  
Significant positive values favor the model in the column against the model in the row and negative values favor the row model over the column model. 
Test values in bold are statistically significant at 5% level, those underlined are significant at 10% level. 
 
 
Table 5: Vuong Test Results When Lifetime Output is Calculated With Journal Articles Square-Root-Age Discounted 
MSF  (a) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
CLm (b) -0.18        
CLh (c)  1.45 3.29       
RePEc (d) 1.20 1.76 -0.70      
Coupé (e) 1.71 1.56 -0.14 0.47     
K&Y_all (f) 2.22 2.69 1.01 2.33 1.42    
K&Y_econ (g) 2.14 2.60 0.92 2.21 1.30 -0.72   
KMS (h) 2.80 3.94 3.26 2.62 1.88 1.36 1.44  
LP94 (g) 1.47 1.93 0.18 0.68 0.26 -0.81 -0.72 -1.89
Note: Cell values are z-statistics, calculated from the models reported in Appendix Table 3.  
Significant positive values favor the model in the column against the model in the row and negative values favor the row model over the column model. 
Test values in bold are statistically significant at 5% level, those underlined are significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6: Vuong Test Results for the Sub-sample at the Top Four University of California Departments 
(Lifetime Output Calculated With Journal Articles Square-Root-Age Discounted) 
 
MSF  (a) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
CLm (b) 0.95        
CLh (c)  2.20 3.00       
RePEc (d) 1.67 1.00 -1.21      
Coupé (e) 2.04 0.98 -0.51 0.41     
K&Y_all (f) 2.64 2.09 0.71 2.20 1.75    
K&Y_econ (g) 2.57 2.02 0.63 2.09 1.62 -0.63   
KMS (h) 3.03 3.35 2.86 2.69 2.13 1.49 1.55  
LP94 (g) 1.35 0.85 -0.94 0.13 -0.15 -1.38 -1.30 -2.42
 
Notes:  
Cell values are z-statistics, calculated from the models reported in Appendix Table 3.  
Significant positive values favor the model in the column against the model in the row and negative values favor the row model over the column model. 
Test values in bold are statistically significant at 5% level, those underlined are significant at 10% level. 
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Appendix Table 1: Variable Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations 
 
Variable     Mean Std Dev Description 
Salary  156.66 57.07 Base salary in 2010 ($,000) 
log (annual salary) 11.90 0.35 Logarithm of 2010 base salary 
Experience (years) 18.00 12.43 Years since first appointment (or receipt of PhD if earlier) 
Seniority (years) 12.15 9.97 Years of employment at current university 
Male 0.83 0.37 Person is male (=1) or female (=0) 
Holder of a named chair 0.19 0.40 Person holds an endowed or named position or a distinguished chair 
Not standard pay scale 0.03 0.16 Person is not on a standard, 9-month, academic year pay scale 
Nobel prize winner 0.00 0.07 Winner of the Nobel Prize 
PhD field not economics 0.08 0.27 Person holds a PhD granted from a department that is not economics 
PhD rank (A&K, 2008) 31.61 34.55 Score for PhD-granting department (100=best) using the placement-based 
ranking of Amir and Knauff (2008) 
PhD rank (NRC, 1995) 3.78 1.63 Score for PhD-granting department (5=best) in the 1995 National 
Research Council rankings 
 
Note: N=223. 
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Appendix Table 2: Salary Regressions for UC Economists  
with Lifetime Output of Journal Articles Not Age Discounted 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
MSF 0.009         
 (6.94)**         
CLm  0.013        
  (7.72)**        
CLh   0.017       
   (6.06)**       
RePEc    0.016      
    (6.39)**      
Coupé     0.023     
     (6.02)**     
K&Y (all)      0.023    
      (6.30)**    
K&Y (economics)       0.025   
       (6.14)**   
KMS (2011)        0.024  
        (5.34)**  
LP (1994)         0.027 
         (6.35)** 
Seniority (years) -0.017 -0.019 -0.020 -0.021 -0.018 -0.020 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 
 (3.01)** (3.32)** (3.44)** (3.49)** (3.11)** (3.41)** (3.44)** (3.47)** (3.66)** 
Seniority squared (/100) 0.029 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.029 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.036 
 (1.80)+ (2.15)* (2.09)* (2.10)* (1.74)+ (1.98)* (2.01)* (2.08)* (2.10)* 
Experience (years) 0.035 0.034 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.041 0.042 
 (7.00)** (6.79)** (7.75)** (7.73)** (7.46)** (8.05)** (8.05)** (8.37)** (8.44)** 
Experience sq (/100) -0.058 -0.056 -0.060 -0.062 -0.064 -0.063 -0.063 -0.064 -0.067 
 (4.90)** (4.80)** (5.15)** (5.05)** (4.96)** (5.22)** (5.22)** (5.38)** (5.42)** 
Male 0.045 0.035 0.041 0.046 0.056 0.051 0.052 0.046 0.047 
 (1.24) (0.99) (1.15) (1.29) (1.51) (1.42) (1.44) (1.23) (1.31) 
Holds a named chair 0.085 0.072 0.071 0.083 0.086 0.082 0.083 0.078 0.066 
 (2.54)* (2.30)* (2.17)* (2.54)* (2.55)* (2.48)* (2.52)* (2.19)* (1.97)* 
Nobel prize winner 0.497 0.505 0.457 0.460 0.485 0.445 0.443 0.428 0.417 
 (7.88)** (9.29)** (8.60)** (8.17)** (8.20)** (8.22)** (8.20)** (7.86)** (8.28)** 
Not standard pay scale 0.173 0.169 0.165 0.180 0.177 0.191 0.190 0.160 0.149 
 (3.30)** (3.17)** (2.77)** (3.10)** (3.15)** (3.06)** (3.05)** (2.36)* (2.37)* 
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Appendix Table 2 continued         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Davis -0.322 -0.299 -0.294 -0.297 -0.293 -0.291 -0.293 -0.304 -0.305 
 (6.55)** (6.19)** (5.93)** (5.81)** (5.64)** (5.60)** (5.65)** (6.01)** (6.11)** 
Irvine -0.291 -0.271 -0.250 -0.252 -0.256 -0.240 -0.242 -0.257 -0.257 
 (6.29)** (6.16)** (5.51)** (5.38)** (5.24)** (5.00)** (5.04)** (5.49)** (5.60)** 
Merced -0.366 -0.335 -0.322 -0.327 -0.332 -0.318 -0.320 -0.328 -0.338 
 (7.38)** (7.35)** (6.69)** (6.50)** (6.33)** (5.82)** (5.87)** (6.29)** (6.59)** 
Riverside -0.283 -0.252 -0.256 -0.263 -0.257 -0.260 -0.261 -0.274 -0.275 
 (4.77)** (4.15)** (4.19)** (4.22)** (4.00)** (4.13)** (4.16)** (4.52)** (4.51)** 
San Diego -0.104 -0.105 -0.106 -0.099 -0.089 -0.099 -0.099 -0.101 -0.126 
 (2.19)* (2.24)* (2.17)* (2.06)* (1.82)+ (2.02)* (2.02)* (1.98)* (2.63)** 
Santa Barbara -0.260 -0.245 -0.253 -0.252 -0.241 -0.246 -0.248 -0.274 -0.269 
 (5.09)** (4.89)** (5.02)** (4.80)** (4.53)** (4.69)** (4.74)** (5.51)** (5.32)** 
Santa Cruz -0.306 -0.286 -0.274 -0.282 -0.275 -0.270 -0.271 -0.285 -0.277 
 (6.31)** (5.89)** (5.50)** (5.55)** (5.26)** (5.15)** (5.17)** (5.64)** (5.42)** 
Los Angeles 0.138 0.138 0.125 0.139 0.155 0.141 0.140 0.129 0.097 
 (2.58)* (2.62)** (2.38)* (2.56)* (2.79)** (2.60)* (2.57)* (2.40)* (1.86)+ 
Constant 11.642 11.643 11.627 11.626 11.606 11.609 11.611 11.624 11.631 
 (216.53)** (217.89)** (214.19)** (212.88)** (208.00)** (210.03)** (210.23)** (207.99)** (213.66)** 
R2 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.77 
Log-likelihood 83.66 87.49 83.06 80.00 79.28 79.07 78.92 75.63 80.27 
Akaike’s info criteria -133.33 -141.99 -132.12 -126.00 -124.57 -124.13 -123.84 -117.27 -126.53 
Bayesian info criteria -75.40 -83.07 -74.20 -68.07 -66.65 -66.21 -65.92 -59.34 -68.61 
 
Note:  
Dependent variable is log of base salary for the 2010 academic year, as reported at: http://www.sacbee.com/statepay/ with economists at UC Berkeley as the 
excluded group for the fixed effects. N=223, robust t statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%. 
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Appendix Table 3: Salary Regressions for UC Economists  
with Lifetime Output of Journal Articles Square-Root-Age Discounted 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
MSF 0.028         
 (7.85)**         
CLm  0.039        
  (7.93)**        
CLh   0.047       
   (6.19)**       
RePEc     0.052      
    (7.28)**      
Coupé     0.072     
     (7.04)**     
K&Y (all)      0.063    
      (6.34)**    
K&Y (economics)       0.069   
       (6.09)**   
KMS (2011)        0.065  
        (4.70)**  
LP (1994)         0.083 
         (7.15)** 
Seniority (years) -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.018 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 
 (3.17)** (3.37)** (3.36)** (3.53)** (3.20)** (3.37)** (3.42)** (3.39)** (3.68)** 
Seniority squared (/100) 0.030 0.033 0.032 0.036 0.029 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.036 
 (1.94)+ (2.17)* (2.01)* (2.17)* (1.85)+ (1.91)+ (1.95)+ (1.98)* (2.16)* 
Experience (years) 0.034 0.034 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.040 0.040 0.042 0.041 
 (7.64)** (7.62)** (8.62)** (8.12)** (7.87)** (8.73)** (8.69)** (9.02)** (9.00)** 
Experience sq (/100) -0.052 -0.051 -0.057 -0.055 -0.057 -0.059 -0.059 -0.062 -0.062 
 (5.11)** (5.10)** (5.42)** (5.10)** (5.08)** (5.40)** (5.39)** (5.65)** (5.59)** 
Male 0.038 0.029 0.038 0.041 0.052 0.057 0.059 0.045 0.042 
 (1.10) (0.85) (1.07) (1.16) (1.43) (1.56) (1.58) (1.21) (1.17) 
Holds a named chair 0.099 0.088 0.088 0.094 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.098 0.083 
 (3.07)** (2.82)** (2.66)** (2.94)** (3.16)** (3.12)** (3.15)** (2.71)** (2.50)* 
Nobel prize winner 0.492 0.483 0.434 0.450 0.467 0.408 0.407 0.398 0.407 
 (8.33)** (9.60)** (8.63)** (8.68)** (8.83)** (8.23)** (8.19)** (7.75)** (8.34)** 
Not standard pay scale 0.204 0.198 0.188 0.216 0.210 0.212 0.212 0.177 0.175 
 (4.06)** (4.05)** (3.52)** (3.90)** (3.83)** (3.56)** (3.56)** (2.81)** (3.07)** 
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Appendix Table 3 continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Davis -0.301 -0.278 -0.275 -0.263 -0.262 -0.275 -0.275 -0.290 -0.278 
 (6.18)** (5.65)** (5.44)** (5.09)** (4.91)** (5.17)** (5.19)** (5.74)** (5.40)** 
Irvine -0.281 -0.255 -0.231 -0.222 -0.232 -0.229 -0.230 -0.242 -0.234 
 (6.02)** (5.73)** (5.02)** (4.73)** (4.70)** (4.72)** (4.72)** (5.18)** (4.99)** 
Merced -0.346 -0.304 -0.289 -0.285 -0.297 -0.293 -0.295 -0.304 -0.303 
 (6.61)** (6.30)** (5.62)** (5.50)** (5.38)** (4.94)** (4.95)** (5.49)** (5.58)** 
Riverside -0.265 -0.241 -0.247 -0.232 -0.233 -0.255 -0.255 -0.269 -0.256 
 (4.60)** (4.08)** (4.18)** (3.82)** (3.75)** (4.21)** (4.18)** (4.58)** (4.29)** 
San Diego -0.090 -0.081 -0.076 -0.072 -0.065 -0.081 -0.082 -0.077 -0.100 
 (1.92)+ (1.71)+ (1.55) (1.51) (1.33) (1.63) (1.64) (1.48) (2.08)* 
Santa Barbara -0.239 -0.226 -0.236 -0.220 -0.213 -0.232 -0.233 -0.261 -0.246 
 (4.82)** (4.57)** (4.72)** (4.26)** (4.05)** (4.44)** (4.44)** (5.33)** (4.84)** 
Santa Cruz -0.290 -0.270 -0.260 -0.256 -0.247 -0.256 -0.256 -0.276 -0.257 
 (5.81)** (5.33)** (5.00)** (4.94)** (4.59)** (4.73)** (4.72)** (5.31)** (4.83)** 
Los Angeles 0.147 0.148 0.136 0.157 0.170 0.150 0.148 0.139 0.108 
 (2.88)** (2.89)** (2.63)** (2.97)** (3.17)** (2.79)** (2.77)** (2.64)** (2.10)* 
Constant 11.606 11.597 11.581 11.581 11.565 11.569 11.571 11.586 11.592 
 (216.61)** (213.42)** (208.22)** (206.95)** (203.73)** (200.92)** (201.23)** (205.99)** (207.43)** 
R2 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.77 
Log-likelihood 90.31 90.91 84.09 86.05 84.69 80.59 80.89 75.27 83.52 
Akaike’s info criteria -146.62 -147.82 -134.18 -138.09 -135.38 -127.18 -127.78 -116.54 -133.05 
Bayesian info criteria -88.70 -89.90 -76.26 -80.17 -77.46 -69.26 -69.86 -58.62 -75.13 
 
Note:  
Dependent variable is log of base salary for the 2010 academic year, as reported at: http://www.sacbee.com/statepay/ with economists at UC Berkeley as the 
excluded group for the fixed effects. N=223, robust t statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%. 
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Appendix Table 4: Salary Regressions for UC Economists at the Top Four Departments  
(Articles Square Root-Age Discounted) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
MSF 0.031         
 (6.89)**         
CLm  0.038        
  (6.28)**        
CLh   0.043       
   (5.05)**       
RePEc     0.050      
    (5.89)**      
Coupé     0.071     
     (5.85)**     
K&Y (all)      0.057    
      (5.04)**    
K&Y (economics)       0.062   
       (4.87)**   
KMS (2011)        0.057  
        (3.51)**  
LP (1994)         0.081 
         (6.41)** 
Seniority (years) -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 
 (1.24) (1.20) (1.04) (1.29) (1.14) (1.17) (1.22) (1.07) (1.28) 
Seniority squared (/100) 0.018 0.017 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.016 
 (0.78) (0.73) (0.53) (0.78) (0.57) (0.51) (0.55) (0.49) (0.66) 
Experience (years) 0.038 0.038 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.043 0.043 0.045 0.043 
 (5.28)** (5.40)** (5.68)** (5.60)** (5.61)** (5.68)** (5.70)** (5.87)** (5.99)** 
Experience sq (/100) -0.071 -0.068 -0.072 -0.073 -0.076 -0.074 -0.074 -0.078 -0.076 
 (4.73)** (4.80)** (4.82)** (4.83)** (4.87)** (4.65)** (4.68)** (5.02)** (4.87)** 
Male 0.053 0.041 0.047 0.049 0.062 0.068 0.069 0.054 0.044 
 (1.11) (0.84) (0.92) (0.99) (1.24) (1.30) (1.32) (1.01) (0.87) 
Holds a named chair 0.094 0.089 0.098 0.094 0.104 0.113 0.114 0.119 0.092 
 (2.29)* (2.20)* (2.22)* (2.29)* (2.48)* (2.62)** (2.63)** (2.47)* (2.14)* 
Not standard pay scale 0.224 0.205 0.193 0.233 0.230 0.224 0.225 0.180 0.186 
 (3.41)** (3.17)** (2.78)** (3.29)** (3.33)** (3.02)** (3.02)** (2.28)* (2.43)* 
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Appendix Table 4 continued         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Davis -0.305 -0.292 -0.296 -0.280 -0.276 -0.295 -0.295 -0.312 -0.294 
 (5.89)** (5.64)** (5.59)** (5.12)** (4.87)** (5.25)** (5.26)** (5.91)** (5.49)** 
San Diego -0.088 -0.083 -0.079 -0.075 -0.066 -0.082 -0.083 -0.077 -0.100 
 (1.84)+ (1.68)+ (1.55) (1.49) (1.31) (1.57) (1.59) (1.46) (1.99)* 
Los Angeles 0.157 0.153 0.143 0.162 0.177 0.155 0.153 0.146 0.117 
 (3.10)** (3.01)** (2.76)** (3.07)** (3.31)** (2.85)** (2.84)** (2.80)** (2.27)* 
Constant 11.549 11.552 11.543 11.541 11.518 11.530 11.532 11.543 11.560 
 (175.11)** (173.55)** (168.45)** (167.95)** (168.46)** (163.76)** (163.93)** (165.68)** (169.92)** 
R2 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.74 
Log-likelihood 45.86 43.85 39.36 41.85 40.97 37.48 37.67 33.28 41.48 
Akaike’s info criteria -67.72 -63.71 -54.72 -59.69 -57.94 -50.96 -51.34 -42.57 -58.96 
Bayesian info criteria -32.77 -28.76 -19.77 -24.74 -22.99 -16.01 -16.39 -7.61 -24.01 
 
Note:  
Dependent variable is log of base salary for the 2010 academic year, as reported at: http://www.sacbee.com/statepay/ with economists at UC Berkeley as the 
excluded group for the fixed effects. N=136, robust t statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%. 
 
 
 
